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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF T E  CASE 
The DefendantslAppellants, Lance D. Holcomb and Jennifer K. Holcomb, dba Holcomb 
Construction (hereafter "Holcomb") have appealed the Memorandum Decision and Order entered 
by District Court JudgeBradbury on January 8,2008, in which the PlaintiffsIRespondents, Bradley 
J. Zenner and Allason M. Zenner (hereafter "Zenner") were awarded $106,049.29 for attorney fees 
and $14,215.64 for costs. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 19, 2002, Zenner contracted with Holcomb to build a house for them on their 
property near Nezperce, Lewis County, Idaho. (R. p. 14) The contract was drafted by Holcomb and 
paragraph 20 of the contract provided as follows: 
Attorney's fees. Should any kind of proceeding including litigation or arbitration be 
necessary to enforce the provisions of this agreement the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to have it's attorney's fees and costs paid by the other party. 
(R. p. 14) 
On December 29,2003, Zenner filed a complaint requesting damages for breach of contract 
against Holcomb. (R. pp. 1-5) A ten day jury trial was held in Lewis County beginning October 1, 
2007. (R. p. 15) Zenner sought $120,000 in damages at trial, Holcomb argued for minimal 
damages, and ultimately the jury awarded $40,000 to Zenner. (R. pp. 15, 18) 
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Zenner then submitted aMemorandumof Costs and an Affidavit of Attorney Fees which was 
contested by Holcomb. The District Court heard oral argument on November 21,2007, and on 
January 8,2008 issued its Memorandm Decision and Order (hereafter "Order") awarding Zenner 
the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by Zenner in their dispute with Holcomb. (R. pp. 14- 
26) On January 11, 2008, an Amended Judgment on Verdict was entered awarding Zenner 
$106,049.29 for attorney fees and $14,215.64 for costs. (R. pp. 27-28) Subsequently Holcomb has 
appealed the award of attorney fees and costs. (R. pp. 29-31) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Holcomb has identified four issues on appeal: 
1. Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Zenner was 
the prevailing party. 
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in its award of attorney fees by failing to consider 
the factors set out in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
3. Whether or not the trial court erred in its award of costs by failing to consider the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). 
4. Whether or not Holcomb is entitled their attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
I A W  OFFICES OF 
CLARK A N D  FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 89501 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT 
ZENNER WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY 
The determination of who is a prevailing party, for the purpose of receiving an award of 
attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 
105 Idaho 158,161,666 P.2d 1169,1172 (Ct. App. 1983). That determination will not be disturbed 
unless an abuse of discretion has occurred. Id. Where the trial court has exercised its discretion after 
a careful consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, and without 
arbitrary disregard for those facts and principles of justice, that exercise of discretion has not been 
abused and will not be disturbed. Id. 
The exercise of that discretion is guided by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) which provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the 
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were 
multiple claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross issues between the parties, 
and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. The 
trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in 
part and didnot prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784,787,874 P.2d 595,598 (Ct. App. 1994). In reviewing on appeal 
an exercise of the trial court's discretion, the Court considers (I) whether the lower court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such 
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discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether 
the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
In this case areview of the District Court's Order shows that in determining that Zenner was 
the prevailing party, the District Court perceived that determination as one of its discretion, acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), and reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. See R. pp. 16-19. 
While conceding that the District Court perceived this issue as one of discretion, Holcomb 
contends that the District Court did not act within the boundaries and consistent with the legal 
standards applicable to specific choices available to the District Court nor did the District Court 
engage in an exercise of reason. Zenner disagrees with these contentions. 
Holcomb first takes issue with the District Court's use of the offer of judgment in its 
prevailing party analysis. This argument lacks merit in light of the fact that Holcomb argued that 
the offer of judgment supported their contention that Holcomb, and not Zenner, should be considered 
the prevailing party because the jury award was only $5,000 more than the offer of judgment. 
Holcomb made the offer of judgment an issue in the prevailing party analysis and cannot now take 
the position that the District Court abused its discretion by addressing the offer of judgment in its 
prevailing party analysis when Holcomb argued the offer of judgment in support of their position. 
Holcomb's position that the District Court abused its discretion by considering the offer of 
judgment in its analysis is further without merit based on Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 855 
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P.2d 40 (1993). While Holcomb has cited this case in support of their position, Ireland does not 
actually hold that considering the offer of judgment was an abuse of discretion. In fact, while the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Ireland stated that the trial court should not have considered the offer of 
judgment in its analysis, the Court still found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 123 
Idaho at 961, 855 P.2d at 46 (we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in awarding 
respondent his attorney fees). 
Ireland further undermines Holcomb's argument that the District Court abused its discretion 
by considering factors beyond L.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Ireland stands for the proposition that the 
opposite is true, that considering factors beyond I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) is not an abuse of discretion 
as long as a trial court considers the factors in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). While Zenner's position is that 
theDistrict Court did not consider any irrelevant or inappropriate factors in determining that Zenner 
was the prevailing party, for argument sake, even if the District Court had it would still not have 
abused its discretion. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) requires that the District Court consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The District 
Court did so in this matter. See R. p. 18 (In exercising that discretion I consider whether or not the 
jury decided in the Zenners' favor, how the jury award compared to what was sought, ...) The 
District Court's determination that Zenner was the prevailing party was reached through an exercise 
of reason. See R. p. 18 (There is no question that the Zenners recovered. Mr. Holcomb initially did 
not want to pay anything for repairs. He argued for minimal damages at trial.) 
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A review of the Order at issue in this case does not support the conclusion that the District 
Court abused its discretion in determining that Zenner was the prevailing party. The District Court 
identified that the determination was discretionary, identified the factorsin I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), and 
applied the facts reasonably to these factors in making its determination that Zenner was the 
prevailing party. Rolcomb has failed to show that the District Court's decision on this matter is an 
abuse of discretion and Zenner respectfully urges this Court to affirm the District Court's decision 
on this issue. 
B. TEII! TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN rrs AWARD OF AVORNEY FEES BY 
FAlLIavG TO CONSIDER THE FACTORS SET OUT IN I.R.C.P. 54(E)(3). 
The genesis of the underlying case is a building contract between the parties that was 
subsequently breached by Holcomb. (Holcomb ultimately admitted the job was defective. See R. 
p. 25)  This contract was drafted by the Defendants and paragraph 20 of the contract provided at 
follows: 
Attorney's fees. Should any kind of proceeding including litigation or arbitration be 
necessary to enforce the provisions of this agreement the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to have it's attorney's fees and costs paid by the other party. 
(Emphasis mine) 
In its Order, theDistrict Court held that Zenner was entitled to their actual attorney fees and 
costs based on the contract between the parties and that the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) does not apply based 
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on the terms of the contract. See R. pp. 19-25. Holcomb contends that the District Court erred in 
failing to apply the factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) to the award of attorney fees. 
Analyzing thecontract between the parties and the applicable law establishes that theDistrict 
Court did not err in its decision regarding this issue. The District Court began its analysis by 
pointing out that the there was no condition in the contract limiting attorney fees and costs to what 
is reasonable, that the purpose of contracts is to allocate duties and risks, persons are entitled to 
contract for anything that is legal, and since there was no evidence of disparity in bargainingpower, 
fraud, or overreaching, it was obligated to enforce the terms of the contract. (R. pp. 19-20) 
The District Court then correctly pointed out that courts are not permitted to add terms to a 
contract, and unless ambiguous, a contract must be interpreted according to the plain meaning of its 
terms. (R. p. 20) The District Court found that the contract is not ambiguous and even if it was then 
it would still be construed against Holcomb because it was his contract. (R. p. 21) TheDistrict Court 
concluded that the contract shouldnot be tempered by the reasonableness criteria of I.R.C.P,54(e)(3) 
unless the contract explicitly or implicitly provided for that and the District Court found that in this 
case the contract did not make such a provision. (R. pp. 22-25) 
The District Court's analysis is right on especially consider the plain language of I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(8): 
The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable to ... any 
claim for attorney fees made pursuant to any other statute, or pursuant to any 
contract, to the extent that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for 
attorney fees would not be inconsistent with such other statute or contract. 
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(Emphasis mine) 
In this case applying the reasonableness criteria in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) to the contract is 
inconsistent with the plain unambiguous language of the contract and contradicts the plain language 
of T.R.C.P. 54(e)(8). As such the District Court did not err in awarding Zenner their attorney fees 
without considering I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
It must be emphasized that, pursuant to the contract, the prevailing party is entitled to have 
the other side pay its attorney's fees and costs. Nowhere does the contract limit the prevailing 
party's award of attorney fees and costs to a reasonable analysis. By no means does that imply that 
the Zenner's attorney fees and costs are unreasonable, the point is that the contract states that the 
prevailing party gets its attorney fees and costs - simple as that. 
This contract was draftedby Holcomb andHolcomb hadevery opportunity to draft paragraph 
20 to provide that the prevailing party be awarded "reasonable" attorney fees. However, Holcornb 
did not draft the contract that way, and the plain language of the contract does not require a 
reasonable analysis. As written, the contract provides that the prevailing party gets the actual 
attorney's fees and costs that it incurred from the other party. The purpose of contractual attorney 
fee provisions are to deter litigation and parties to such contracts proceed at their own risk that they 
might have to not only pay their own attorney's fees and costs, but the other side's as well. Holcomb 
drafted this contract and proceeded with litigation expecting that if they prevailed that they would 
be entitled to receive their attorney's fees and costs, however, Zenner and not Holcomb prevailed. 
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As such, the District Court's decision awarding Zenner the attorney fees submitted without 
considering I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is not in e n  and should be affirmed. 
Holcomb's contention that the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) applies to any contract providing 
attorney fees contradicts the plain language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8). The plain language does not 
support such aconclusion and in fact expressly states differently. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8) (to the extent 
that the application of this Rule54(e) to such a claim for attorney fees would not be inconsistent with 
such other statute or contract) 
The contract in this case provides that the "prevailing party shall be entitled to have it's 
attorney's fees and costs paid by the other party." Zenner is the prevailing party and submitted the 
attorney fees that they have contractually incurred to the District Court. If the District Court had 
applied the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) to the Zenner's attorney fees, the District Court would have 
been in essence rewriting an unambiguous contract on its own accord. Such an action is contrary 
not only to the plain language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8) but also to well established contractual principles. 
As such Holcomb respectfully contends that theDistrict Court didnot err and requests that this Court 
affirm the District Court's award of attorney fees to Zenner. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS AWARD OF COSTS BY FAILJNG TO 
CONSIDER THE FACTORS SET OUT IN I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). 
For the same reasons set forth above, the District Court did not err by not considering the 
factors set out in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). The plain and unambiguous terms of the contract drafted by 
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Holcomb dictate that Zenner is entitledto thecosts they incurred. No additional analysis is required 
and to do so would be in err. Zennerrespectfully urges the Court to affirm the District Court's award 
of costs as set forth in his Order. 
D. HOLCOMB IS NOT ENTJTLFiD TO THEIR ATTORNEY EEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Holcomb is not entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to IAR 41 and Idaho Code 12- 
121. Under1.C. 12-121, the Court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party only if the Court 
is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 436, 111 P.3d 110, 121 (2005). 
Obviously that is not the case in this matter and pursuant to contract drafted by Holcomb, Zenner 
will be entitled to attorney fees and costs relating to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the District Coua did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zenner 
was tbe prevailing party. Furthermore, based on the contract between the parties and applicable law, 
the District Court didnot err in awardingzenner attorney fees andcosts without considering I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). As such Holcomb is not entitled to attorney fees and costs relating 
to this appeal. 
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DATED this 14th day of August, 2008. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
Clark, a member of the firm. 
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